By Lady Olga Maitland 22 March 2025
The discussions between Presidents Putin and Trump evokes echoes of Yalta, with great powers once again determining borders—this time, Ukraine’s. At the heart of the negotiations lies a troubling calculus: Donald Trump will be negotiating with Vladimir Putin how large a reward he will get for his eleven years of open aggression against Ukraine. The price for stopping the guns will be to sacrifice Ukraine, dividing up its interests as suits them. What does not seem to be taken into account are the views of Ukraine and Europe both of whom have been left out in the cold. And in truth, their gearing up militarily is still decidedly timid in the face of a new threat landscape.
Among Moscow’s demands are the removal of Ukraine’s President Zelensky and a call for fresh elections, aimed at installing a pro-Russian leader. Yet even Ukraine’s opposition, often critical of Mr. Zelensky, is unlikely to deviate from his steadfast stance against Russian encroachment.
We have picked up a report about Russian manipulation of American public opinion of President Zelensksy. The aim is to besmirch the Ukrainian leader to such a degree that public opinion will swing behind any President Trump concessions makes to President Putin.
Meanwhile, Europe faces mounting pressure to seize the $240 billion in frozen Russian Central Bank assets. Thus far, only the interest on these funds has been transferred to Ukraine. Nigel Gould-Davies of the International Institute for Strategic Studies argues for swift action, viewing the move as a rare opportunity to enforce compensation amid the aggressor’s victory. To hand the money back to Russia would empower them to rebuild their military capability which had been run down by the war. Cautious voices, however, fear the potential erosion of confidence in European banking systems.
Earlier this week, I was in touch with Nigel Gould Davies, who gave his perspective on the talks between President Trump and President Putin:
“The probability of a ceasefire, let alone a permanent end to Russia’s war in Ukraine, remains very low. President Putin has repeatedly stated to domestic audiences over the past year that he is opposed to a ceasefire or freezing of the conflict, and seeks only a final settlement negotiated with the United States. The terms he demands would lead to the political and military subordination of Ukraine – the initial goal of Russia’s invasion.
As a result of US pressure - specifically, the deprival of aid and intelligence - President Zelensky has moderated his position by agreeing to an unconditional ceasefire, dropping his demand for a security guarantee.
But in his 18 March phone call with Trump, Putin once again rejected a ceasefire (while ostensibly expressing interest) by setting unacceptable conditions. These include an end to aid to Ukraine and to Ukrainian military recruitment. In doing so, Putin sought to persuade Trump that it is Zelensky, not he, who is responsible for the failure to achieve the end to the war that Trump has set as a top priority. The diplomatic process is set to continue, with a focus on suspending attacks on energy infrastructure. Even if apparently agreed, this is unlikely to be achieved or enforceable, or to lead to a wider ceasefire.
The key question now is which side Trump blames for this failure, and what US actions might follow. Trump’s long affinity for Putin suggests he is unlikely to blame, let alone coerce, him, despite occasional threats of further sanctions. Putin will continue his offensive against Ukraine unless he judges that doing so would threaten the stability of his regime. It thus seems most likely that the war, which Putin believes Russia will eventually win, will continue.”
We are into a period of a war of words, broken promises and more talks. We have maintained contact with Ukrainian MP Lesia Vasylenko, who addressed DSF last summer. Her message to me was stark. “As you can imagine we are amidst a very heated international storm. Putin wants to disarm Ukraine and attack again, hence his blunt requests to stop mobilization and foreign weapon deliveries. The Russians changed their constitution in 2022 so that the territory of Russia includes whole regions of Ukraine. This means they will go on at least to secure the ‘de facto’ and ‘de jure’ control over these areas.”
Dr Nigel Gould-Davies finished by saying to me: ’Loose talk in the West of a likely ceasefire just doesn’t understand Putin’s intentions and underestimates his obsession with Ukraine. Not that he would stop there.’ The stakes could scarcely be higher.
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